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Abstract
Researchers have proposed many explanations for the replicated finding that jurors often
fail to disregard evidence when instructed by a judge to do so. We propose a novel
explanation: that the act of objecting may cause the effect because an objection (a) draws
attention to the testimony and (b) heightens the perceived importance of the testimony
(because of the implication that the objecting party wants to prevent jurors from using it).
In previous studies, the act of objecting has always been confounded with the presence of
the critical (objected-to) testimony. We devised two new experimental conditions that
unconfound these factors. We found that whereas objections increase the use of objectedto (incriminating) testimony, random (non-objection) interruptions decrease use of this
testimony. We conclude that, unlike random interruptions, an objection communicates to
the jurors that an attorney is concerned about the objected-to testimony, increasing the
perceived importance of that testimony.
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Beyond Instructions to Disregard:
When Objections Backfire and Interruptions Distract

It is a familiar scene from a television show: a prosecutor who is cross-examining
the defendant asks a question that results in the defendant providing an incriminating
response. The defense attorney, recognizing that the question was improper, rises to her
feet, calling out, “Objection!” She may explain why she thinks the testimony is
inadmissible. The judge then decides either to overrule or to sustain the objection; if the
latter, the ruling may come with the instruction: “The jury must disregard the witness’s
testimony.”
Many televisions viewers have probably scoffed at the notion that jurors can
disregard incriminating evidence once they’ve heard it. Our intuitions aside, the question
remains: Can jurors ignore information? Do they when instructed to? If jurors don’t
disregard, why don’t they? Most psychological research has suggested that jurors do not
entirely disregard inadmissible evidence. In fact, the literature suggests that not only are
jurors unable and often unwilling to forget the testimony they have heard (Carretta &
Moreland, 1983; Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Kassin & Sommers, 1997;
Thompson, Fong, & Rosenham, 1981; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977), but also that a
judge’s instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence can actually magnify the impact
such evidence has on jurors’ guilt decisions and sentencing recommendations (Reinard &
Reynolds, 1978; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Tanford, 1990). For example, mock
jurors in a civil trial who had been told the defendant had insurance but were instructed to
disregard this information awarded higher damages to the plaintiff than those jurors who
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thought the defendant had no insurance or those that had been told the defendant did have
insurance but were not instructed to disregard the information (Broeder, 1959). The
question that remains is why don’t jurors disregard inadmissible evidence?
Theoretical Explanations for the Boomerang Effect
Various theories have been advanced to explain why jurors not only do not
disregard inadmissible testimony, but also may even give the testimony more weight after
being instructed to disregard it. Some explanations center on a jury’s unwillingness to
disregard the testimony; others focus on the jury’s inability to disregard the testimony.
Unwillingness to Disregard (Social Factors)
Several theories suggest that even if jurors are able to disregard the crucial
testimony, they choose not to. When jurors are unwilling to follow a judge’s instruction,
it is generally because of social factors (such as jurors’ reasoning about the motivation of
the witnesses or the reliability of the evidence).
Reactance theory. Reactance theory proposes that jurors are unwilling to follow
the judge’s instructions to disregard because jurors feel as if these instructions threaten
their freedom to consider all available evidence (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For example,
mock jurors who were specifically and firmly admonished to disregard certain testimony
reported a greater desire to consider the inadmissible evidence than jurors who had not
received the admonishment. Jurors who felt that their freedom was thus threatened also
experienced a “boomerang effect”: they were influenced by the very testimony that they
had been instructed to disregard (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977).
Desire for justice. Another reason jurors may fail to disregard evidence is that
they want to return a just verdict. Sommers and Kassin (1997) demonstrated that jurors
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are more likely to disregard inadmissible evidence when the evidence seems unreliable.
Mock jurors heard a tape containing incriminating evidence. They were then instructed
to disregard that evidence because either (a) the information on the tape was illegally
obtained or (b) the quality of the recording rendered the information on the tape suspect.
Participants were significantly less likely to allow the evidence to influence their verdicts
when the reason to do so involved a “technicality” than when it involved the potential for
unreliability of the information. Thus, jurors may selectively comply with instructions
depending on reasons – and, at least in part, disregarding is a matter of willingness not
ability.
Inability to Disregard (Cognitive Factors)
On the other hand, when jurors are unable to disregard testimony, explanations
tend to be cognitive. These theories include the ironic process model, belief
perseverance, and the story model. They also include the hindsight bias, which suggests
that even if jurors could disregard specific testimony, they might not be able to disregard
inferences made based on that testimony.
Ironic effects of thought suppression. Research on the ironic effects of thought
suppression (Wegner & Erber, 1992) indicates that a juror who is trying to ignore certain
information may end up thinking about it with increased frequency. Wegner and
colleagues have discovered that trying not to think of a white bear, for example, actually
increases people’s tendency to do so (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al., 1987). The
harder people try to suppress a certain thought, the more likely it is that this thought will
continue to surface (Wegner, 1994). The ironic process model suggests that jurors who
attempt to suppress specific testimony while simultaneously attending to other aspects of
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the trial might suffer thought intrusion with respect to the inadmissible testimony. Thus,
as a consequence of attempting to forget inadmissible testimony, jurors may actually
think more about that very testimony (Clavet, 1996). Moreover, research has shown that
people have an especially difficult time suppressing emotionally charged information,
such as the type that might surface during a trial (Edwards & Bryan, 1997).
Belief perseverance. Research on belief perseverance has shown that when
participants are given information, particularly with respect to characterizations of human
beings, and asked to generate explanations for the information, they are likely to maintain
these beliefs even after they have been told that the information is false (Anderson,
Lepper, & Ross, 1980). In one study illustrating this effect, participants read a case study
about firefighters. Half of the participants were told that the best firefighters were risk
takers and half were told that cautious types made the best firefighters, then they were
asked to justify the particular characterization they had read. Next, participants were
informed that the characterizations included in the case study had been fabricated
specifically for the purposes of the study. When later asked about the relationship
between personality and firefighting ability, however, participants seemed to have come
to believe the characterizations they had been asked to support with reasons earlier in the
study. The authors of the study noted that if jurors have already begun to generate some
explanatory structure for certain testimony, subsequent instructions to disregard the
testimony would likely fail as a result of belief perseverance (Kassin & Studebaker,
1998).
Correction comprehension. Whereas belief perseverance focuses on the longevity
of a belief, correction comprehension focuses on the ability of people to rectify erroneous
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beliefs. If human beings were perfectly logical machines, they would be able to erase the
effects of false information on their understanding of the world upon learning that the
information was misleading or false. However, people seem to automatically accept
information as they receive it, making the renunciation of that information difficult after
the fact (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993). Story coherence and constructing
narratives. Understanding how individuals construct narratives may help to explain why
jurors might incorporate inadmissible testimony into their understanding of events during
trial. In order to understand the “story” they are hearing, jurors create a cognitive
representation, or schema, gathering and organizing the evidence presented in order to
generate a coherent representation of events (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Before they
can disregard testimony, jurors must deconstruct the narrative they have already
constructed, a difficult task (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Studies of reading comprehension
and directed forgetting show that information that is particularly causal or consequential,
and thus tightly incorporated into a narrative, is viewed as particularly important
(Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985) and that as information becomes more meaningful, it
becomes more difficult to forget (Geiselman, 1974). Thus, jurors should have a difficult
time disregarding a piece of information that is key to the outcome of a story.
Hindsight Bias. Even if particular “facts” presented in testimony could be
disregarded, research on the hindsight bias suggests that inferences that jurors had drawn
from those facts probably could not be. Hindsight bias occurs when individuals
overestimate the importance or likeliness of an event because of a known outcome
(Fischhoff, 1975). According to Fischhoff, when individuals are attempting to
reconstruct events, once they have a coherent story in mind, they assign causal events
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(events that are deemed to be connected to the outcome of the story) greater importance
or obviousness. The result is that the outcome appears to be inevitable in light of those
causal events. Of particular relevance is Fischhoff’s finding that even when individuals
are successful in suppressing specific knowledge leading to an insight or inference, they
are unable to suppress insights gleaned from having that specific (outcome-related)
information (Rachlinski, 2000). This research suggests that even if jurors were able to
suppress thoughts about specific evidence, their verdicts might still be affected by the
inferences created as a result of having heard the information.
A New Focus: The Objection
One piece of the puzzle that has been entirely disregarded (pun intended) is the
objection itself. We propose a novel idea: perhaps jurors are unwilling or unable to
disregard inadmissible evidence precisely because it is objected to. In other words, the
very act of objecting might affect attention to, memory for, and use of the critical
information. There are two reasons why an objection might lead to greater use of the
objected-to testimony. First, (the cognitive reason) is that the objection creates an
interruption that may serve to highlight the objected-to testimony, making it particularly
memorable. Second, (the social reason) is that the objection reveals that one party hopes
to prevent the jury from using the objected-to evidence, which signals that the evidence
may be particularly damaging to that party (and particularly relevant to a verdict
determination).
“Objection!” as Interruption
An objection creates an interruption that may serve to “spotlight” the objected-to
testimony. Because the objection-interruption is different from what occurs prior to the
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objection, it may stand out as distinct and unusual. It may also serve to “wake up” jurors
and may cause the jury to pay special attention to the objected-to testimony. Several
features of the objection situation may exacerbate this effect. Following an objection,
jurors may have to wait while the attorneys and the judge confer as to the admissibility of
the testimony. Frequently the discussion occurs at sidebar (out of the hearing of the
jury), creating a prolonged interruption, which may serve to further increase juror
attention to the testimony. Ironically, even a judge’s instruction to disregard may extend
the time that jurors focus on the testimony, increasing the memorability of that testimony.
Enhanced cognition: Interruptions, attention, and memory. Although objections
are courtroom-specific phenomena, objections may function like other types of
interruption in attracting attention. Recently, researchers have theorized that an
important byproduct of interruptions is a change in how attention is allocated.
Investigations examining sources of interruption (such as pain and television
commercials) have suggested that certain types of stimuli that cause interruptions can
increase attentional demands (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Geiger & Reeves, 1993;
Krugman, 1983). This theory hypothesizes that interruptions activate an increase in
attention for targets relevant to the interrupted task, resulting in an increased likelihood
that stimuli related to the task will be noticed. One study using an anagram task found
that anagrams that were associated with an interruption were better remembered than
anagrams associated with task completion (Maentylae & Sgaramella, 1997). Memory
research on the “recency effect” supports the notion that interruptions increase memory
for items linked with or close to the interruption. According to research on the recency
effect, targets presented last in a series are particularly well remembered (Glanzer &
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Cunitz, 1966). One critical component of enhanced memory for recent items is the fact
that they are distinctive (Baddeley & Hitch, 1993; Thapar & Greene, 1993). Just as a
target takes on a distinctive character by virtue of being last, a target also is distinct when
an interruption follows.
The link between interruptions, attention, and memory has been investigated in a
number of contexts, including television commercials (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999),
crime scenes (Williams, Loftus, & Deffenbacher, 1992), and task completion (Zeigarnik,
1927). Although this type of investigation has never extended to the courtroom
environment, evidence from research in other contexts supports the idea that an increase
in attention creates a stronger memory for the object of the attention.
Enhanced motivation: The Zeigarnik effect. In 1927, Zeigarnik proposed that
interrupting individuals as they perform a task could increase their desire to perform the
task and their memory for the task (Zeigarnik, 1927). Kurt Lewin conducted a series of
studies in which he measured the frequency with which participants would return to a
task they had been prevented from completing. Participants in Lewin’s experiments
voluntarily chose to return to the uncompleted task 83% of the time—100% if the
interruption was caused by a chance event (Lewin, 1928). Results from this experiment
suggest that the participants were uncomfortable moving on to a new problem when they
had the sense that they had not finished thinking through the first (interrupted) problem.
“Objection!” as Meaningful Communication
Another way in which an attorney’s objection could influence whether jurors
obey instructions to disregard is if the objection communicates something about the
relative importance of the objected-to testimony. This communication might be
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particularly important in light of the social theories proposing that jurors are unwilling to
disregard testimony.
Reacting against attorney objections. The earlier discussion of reactance theory
explained that individuals resent perceived attempts to threaten their freedom to think as
they choose (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). It may be that jurors resist not only a judge’s
efforts to restrict the information they use, but also react against an attorney’s attempt to
limit the use of evidence. In fact, although judges are (at least arguably) unbiased,
attorneys have a clear agenda, and may be more likely to engender hostility or suspicion
in jurors. Any attempt on the part of an attorney to limit use of testimony, therefore, may
result in a boomerang effect (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977).
Objection as signaling importance of testimony. Jurors may also give particular
weight to objected-to testimony if the objection signals to them that the testimony is
particularly important. An attorney’s clear desire to keep testimony out of the record and
to prevent jurors from using that testimony might cue jurors that the testimony has
serious implications for the verdict. After all, if the testimony were not important, why
would the attorney bother to object? Research indicating that jurors disregard evidence if
it seems unreliable but not if there is a “technical” reason (Sommers & Kassin, 1997)
suggests that jurors tend to use information they think will assist them in arriving at “the
truth”. Thus, testimony that seems particularly likely to bear on the guilt or innocence of
a defendant (very incriminating evidence, for example) will be considered—especially if
its importance is made obvious by virtue of an objection.
Objection Folklore or Litigators’ Wisdom about Judicious Use of Objections
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Although the role of objections has not been studied by behavioral scientists, wisdom
about limiting the use of objections exists among litigators and has been passed down
through manuals and treatises. One guide for attorneys cautions,
. . . there are often good reasons to refrain from objecting. . .[j]uror
reaction . . . becomes a reason to utilize objections wisely and sparingly,
but not to stand in fear of making them at all. . . . Fear of losing, however,
remains a substantial reason to refrain from objecting. No lawyer can
predict with certainty that a judge will agree with his or her objections
(Lubet, 1997, pp. 266-67).
One of the goals of the current investigation is to test what legal practitioners have
already intuited, namely that objections can be counterproductive.
Potential Consequences of Objecting
Suppose that the presence of an objection does affect the processing of, and
reasoning about the objected-to information. If the objection enhances use of the
testimony, it should do so regardless of whether the testimony is ruled inadmissible or
admissible. If the testimony is ruled inadmissible, the objection itself should make the
testimony harder to disregard. If the information is ruled admissible such testimony
might be weighted more heavily than other testimony. Unlike previous studies, our study
included several conditions in which the testimony is admissible in order to determine
precisely how an objection influences use of the objected-to testimony.
Typical Conditions for Evaluating Whether Jurors Disregard
Previous studies of instructions to disregard have not been designed to determine
whether the act of objecting itself affects the jury’s ability to disregard evidence. To
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demonstrate the failure to disregard, experiments typically use two or three conditions.
In the condition of interest (Objection-Inadmissible), participants hear a
contaminant or “critical testimony” (incriminating evidence that should not be allowed to
reach the jury), the critical testimony is objected to, the objection is sustained, and the
jury is instructed to disregard the testimony. To evaluate whether jurors follow the
instruction, verdicts from this Objection-Inadmissible condition are compared to either
one or two “baseline” conditions: (a) a No-Testimony condition (in which jurors never
hear the critical testimony) and sometimes also (b) a Testimony-Objection-Admissible
condition (in which the testimony is present and objected to, but the objection is
overruled, so that the jury is allowed to consider the evidence). Researchers have argued
that a higher percentage of guilty verdicts in the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible
condition versus the No-Testimony condition demonstrates the extent to which jurors
failed to ignore the inadmissible testimony. Researchers have further argued that to the
degree that jurors return more guilty verdicts in the Testimony-Objection-Admissible
than Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition, it demonstrates that jurors are
attempting to at least minimize the influence of the inadmissible evidence.
Importantly, in all of these studies, whenever the critical testimony was present,
the objection was also present. Hence, the presence of the critical testimony and
objection were confounded.
The current design includes five conditions (see Figure 1):
1. No-Testimony: The critical testimony is absent. There is no objection or interruption.
2. Testimony-No-Objection: The critical testimony is present. There is no objection or
interruption.
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3. Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible: The critical testimony is present, it is objected to,
and the judge sustains the objection and instructs jurors to disregard the
testimony.
4. Testimony-Objection-Admissible: The critical testimony is present, it is objected to,
and the judge overrules the testimony so that jurors are permitted to consider it.
5. Testimony-Simple-Interruption: The critical testimony is present. There is an
interruption following the critical testimony, but the interruption does not contain
an objection (i.e., the interruption is devoid of content).
It is important to note that in the Testimony-No-Objection, Testimony-ObjectionAdmissible, and Testimony-Simple-Interruption conditions, jurors hear the testimony and
are permitted to consider it. What differs is whether there is any type of interruption, and
if there is, whether the interruption contains an objection.
Predictions
Experiment 1 used the five conditions illustrated in Figure 1. A greater
proportion of guilty verdicts indicates a greater use of the critical testimony (that is, a
failure to disregard the inadmissible evidence). We predicted:
(1) More guilty verdicts in the Testimony-No-Objection condition than in the NoTestimony condition. Although not theoretically interesting, this difference provides a
manipulation check and baseline evaluation of the potency of the critical testimony.
(2) More guilty verdicts in the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition than
in the No-Testimony condition. This result is a replication of the “standard” failure-todisregard finding. Of course, such a finding could be due to any of the factors previously
mentioned.
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(3) More guilty verdicts in the Testimony-Objection-Admissible condition than in
the Testimony-No-Objection condition. In both conditions jurors hear and are allowed to
use the critical testimony. We believed, however, that the objection itself would not only
focus jurors’ attention on the objected-to testimony, making it more memorable, but
would also reveal the defense’s desire to prevent jurors from using this information in
deciding on a verdict.
(4) If prediction (3) holds, we expected that the proportion of guilty verdicts in the
Testimony-Simple-Interruption condition would reveal what, in particular, about an
objection makes it more likely that jurors will use it. If the Testimony-SimpleInterruption condition yields the same proportion of guilty verdicts as the TestimonyObjection-Admissible condition, it would suggest that what is important about an
objection is that it creates an interruption which spotlights the objected-to testimony. If
the Testimony-Simple-Interruption condition yields fewer guilty verdicts than the
Testimony-Objection-Admissible condition, it would suggest that what is important about
an objection is not the interruption per se, but rather the juror’s knowledge that one side
wanted to hide the testimony.
Method
Participants
A total of 225 undergraduates at the University of Virginia participated for
psychology course credit. There were 93 men and 132 women ranging in age from 18 to
23. Participants were run singly or in groups of 2 to 12 people.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, summarized in
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Figure 1. All participants read and heard evidence from the same criminal trial. The
conditions varied only with respect to whether participants heard a particular piece of
incriminating testimony (the “critical” testimony); whether that testimony was objected
to; and whether the objection was sustained (with instructions to disregard) or overruled
(consideration of the testimony was permitted). In the fifth condition, following the
presentation of the critical testimony, a “simple” (non-objection) interruption occurred.
Procedure
Participants were seated a room designed to resemble a jury room, which had
been equipped with a long table and 12 chairs. They were instructed to imagine that they
were real jurors in a trial. The experimenter briefly described the witnesses and
testimony the jurors would be reading and seeing on the videotape. Participants read the
first witness’s transcript, then the experimenter read a summary of the transcript aloud.
Participants then read the second witness’s transcript and again, the experimenter read a
summary of the transcript aloud. Participants were then told that they would see a
videotape of a segment of a trial, and that they should pay close attention, because they
would be asked to render a verdict following their viewing of the videotape. At the
conclusion of the videotape, jurors were provided with a standard witness instruction for
a criminal trial in the State of Virginia. This instruction provided information about the
burden of proof in a criminal trial as well as other instruction relevant to rendering a
verdict. Jurors then completed the dependent measures.
Materials
The materials consisted of a transcript and a videotape of the testimony of several
witnesses in a (mock) murder trial. (See Appendix for timing and wording of
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transcripts.) The murder involved the shooting death of a pregnant woman. The
defendant, who had been the woman’s lover, was accused of having arranged the victim’s
murder in order to avoid having to pay child support. Importantly, the prosecution’s
theory of the case was that the defendant killed the victim because she refused to
terminate the pregnancy (this theory was key with respect to the critical testimony).
There were five witnesses in the trial. Participants read transcripts of the
testimony of the first two witnesses, which included the questions and answers for each
witness during direct- and cross-examination. Participants saw the next three witnesses
on videotape. Like the transcripts, the videotape included direct- and cross-examination.
Transcripts. The first witness was the victim’s friend, Sara Hastings. Hastings
testified on behalf of the prosecution, stating that the defendant had known that the victim
was pregnant with his child, and that the victim had received several anonymous
threatening notes prior to her death. The second witness was a criminologist who
testified on behalf of the defendant, noting that statistically, perpetrators tend to issue
threats prior to resorting to violence. The criminologist testified that evidence of the
defendant’s having threatened the victim increased the likelihood that the defendant
committed the crime.
Videotape. The first two witnesses on the videotape testified for the prosecution.
The first witness was the defendant’s best friend, who testified that the defendant had
asked him to arrange the murder of the victim. The second witness was the hit man, who
testified that the payment he received for the hit came from the defendant. The third
witness was the defendant, who testified on his own behalf.
The critical testimony occurred while the defendant was on the witness stand. In
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response to a question from the prosecutor, the defendant blurted out that he had tried to
warn the victim. Because he previously denied having had any contact with the victim
for months prior to her death, and because the criminologist testified that perpetrators of
this type of crime (where the perpetrator wants something from the victim) generally
warn or threaten the victim before resorting to violence, this admission was highly
incriminating.
Participants saw one of three tapes.
1. The Testimony-No-Objection condition was the most straightforward
condition. The tape included the critical testimony consisting of the
incriminating admission made by the defendant in which he said that he “tried
to warn” the victim. The tape played all the way through without interruption.
2. In the No-Testimony condition, the tape also played all the way through
without interruption, but the critical testimony was edited out.
3. In the other three conditions, immediately following the critical testimony, the
tape appeared to have been taped over, so that there was a space of 30 seconds
when participants saw nothing on the screen but snow.
During the 30 seconds of snow on tape 3, the experimenter did one of three
things. In the Testimony-Simple-Interruption condition, when the tape malfunctioned,
the researcher simply explained that part of the tape got erased, and did not provide
participants with any information about an objection or judge ruling. In the two
“Objection” conditions, the experimenter stood up in front of the participants, and
apologized for the interruption, explaining that she must have mistakenly grabbed the
“old” tape, in which part of the trial had accidentally been erased. Following this, she
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told the participants that she would explain what was occurring on the tape for the erased
segment. She said that the defense attorney had objected to the admission of the
defendant (to having warned the victim) on the grounds that at the time the defendant
made this statement to the police, he had not been Mirandized—this served as the basis
for the defense attorney’s request that the prosecutor’s question and the defendant’s
answer be stricken from the record.
In the Testimony-Objection-Admissible condition, participants were told that the
judge overruled the defense attorney’s objection, so the testimony would stand. (Hence,
participants in this condition were not given the instruction to disregard the incriminating
testimony.) In the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition, the experimenter told
participants that the judge sustained the objection and instructed the jurors to disregard
that testimony. The researcher emphasized that the participants should not let this
testimony influence their verdict.
Questionnaire. The first three questions asked about guilt. The first question
simply asked for a dichotomous guilty/not guilty verdict. The second question asked for a
determination of legal guilt on a nine-point scale. The scale ranged from “very certain” of
a not guilty verdict to “very certain” of a guilty verdict, with the endpoints being 1 and 9
respectively and with 5 indicating “not sure what verdict to return.” The third question
asked participants to indicate, on a nine-point scale, how likely they thought it was that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was accused (we called this the “gut
instinct” question). This third question was included in order to reveal instances in which
participants who believed that the defendant did commit the crime did not find legal guilt
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(as might be the case in the Testimony-Objection-Disregard condition if participants were
following judge instructions).
Results and Discussion
We found that participants did follow instructions to disregard to some degree.
We also found that when the testimony was admissible and there was an objection, use of
the critical testimony increased. Surprisingly, we found that a simple interruption
actually decreased use of the critical testimony. The dramatic difference between
Testimony-Objection-Admissible and Testimony-Simple-Interruption conditions are
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. We did not find any differences for the “gut instinct”
question (perhaps because of a ceiling effect—most participants thought the defendant
committed the bad act), so those results are not included here.
Critical Testimony Matters (Manipulation Check and Prediction 1)
Hearing the critical testimony increased perceived guilt. Participants in the
Testimony-No-Objection condition returned significantly more guilty verdicts (42%) than
those in the No-Testimony condition (16%), (χ2(1, N = 90) = 7.79, p < .005). They also
rated the defendant as more guilty on the certainty-of-guilt scale, 5.2 vs. 3.6, t(88) = 3.95,
p < .0005.
Failure to Disregard Occurs (Prediction 2)
As found in previous research, participants did not completely disregard the
critical testimony when instructed to do so although it appears that they follwed
instructions to disregard to some degree. Participants in the Testimony-ObjectionInadmissible condition returned more guilty verdicts (22%) than those in the NoTestimony condition (16%). Although this difference was in the predicted direction, it
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was not significant (χ2(1, N = 90) = .65, ns). However, the more sensitive certainly-ofguilt rating scale revealed that participants in the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible
condition were significantly more certain that the defendant was guilty (4.5) than
participants in the No-Testimony condition (3.6), t(88) = 2.46, p < .05.
An Objection (non-significantly) Increases the Use of Critical Testimony (Prediction 3)
When participants were permitted to consider the objected-to testimony, they
were (non-significantly) more likely to find the defendant guilty than when the testimony
was not objected to. Participants in the Testimony-Objection-Admissible condition
returned more guilty verdicts than those in the Testimony-No-Objection condition, 51%
vs. 42%, χ2(1, N = 90) = .71, ns; they were also more certain of guilt (5.5) than those who
did not hear the objection (5.2), t(88) = .75, ns. Although these differences are worth
noting, neither was significant.
A Simple Interruption Decreases Use of Critical Testimony (Prediction 4)
Of great importance is the unexpected finding that an interruption decreases use
of the critical testimony. Participants in the Testimony-Simple-Interruption condition
returned fewer guilty verdicts (24%) than those in the Testimony-No-Objection condition
(42%), χ2(1, N = 90) = 3.2, p <. 07. Although the verdict data showed only a marginally
significant difference, a t-test revealed that participants were significantly more certain of
guilt in the Testimony-No-Objection (5.2) condition than they were in the TestimonySimple-Interruption condition (4.3) (t(88) = 2.00, p < .05). It appears that a simple (nonobjection) interruption caused participants to pay less attention to the critical testimony
than in any other condition—including the condition in which the testimony was not
highlighted in any way. This finding suggests that an interruption that is devoid of any
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meaningful content may serve to distract jurors from the courtroom action, drawing their
attention away from the incriminating testimony.
Now the comparison of the Testimony-Objection-Admissible and the TestimonySimple-Interruption conditions becomes crucial. In each condition, participants heard
and were permitted to use the testimony, and in each, there was an interruption. The
difference was whether the interruption was a content-free event or had meaning (i.e.,
included an objection). In fact, participants in the Testimony-Objection-Admissible
condition rendered more guilty verdicts (51%) than those in the Testimony-SimpleInterruption condition (24%), χ2(1, N = 90) = 6.81, p <. 01). Moreover, participants were
significantly more certain of guilt in the former condition, (5.5, vs. 4.3), t(88) = -2.83, p <
.01. This difference suggests that although the “event” of a non-objection interruption
decreases use of the testimony, an objection-interruption increases use of the testimony.
It appears that when one side objects to testimony, it communicates something important
to jurors, namely that the testimony in question may be particularly important (or
damaging).
Summary and Implications
Experiment 1 provided additional insight into the role the objection might play in
the failure-to-disregard phenomenon. Results suggested that a mere “interruption”
decreases use of the critical testimony, while an objection-interruption can increase use of
the critical testimony. Thus, we believe that the meaning conveyed by the objection not
only results in a greater number of guilty verdicts when the testimony may be used
(comparing the Testimony-Objection-Admissible to the Testimony-Simple-Interruption
conditions) but also in the standard situation when jurors are instructed that they may not
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use the testimony (comparing the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition to the NoTestimony condition).
Experiment 2
Our goal in Experiment 2 was to modify the Testimony-Simple-Interruption
condition, making the interruption less dramatic (and possibly less distracting) and to see,
with this change, whether we would replicate the most important findings from
Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used a relatively simple design including only three
conditions: Testimony-No-Objection, Testimony-Objection-Admissible, and TestimonySimple-Interruption. In all three of these conditions, the critical testimony was present
and admissible, so the question of whether jurors disregard inadmissible testimony was
not at issue. (Thus, we are the first to study the effect of instructions-to-disregard without
any instructions to disregard.) The only aspect that differed between conditions was the
presence and nature of the interruption. (Note: because all conditions contained the
testimony, we will drop the word “Testimony” from the condition labels.)
Experiment 2 used new materials, allowing us to make changes to the procedure.
First, we reduced the interruption interval from 30 seconds in Experiment 1 to 10 seconds
in Experiment 2. We thought that would help avoid losing participants’ attention and
focus during the pause. Second, Experiment 2 did not require the experimenter to
memorize a script. Instead, the manipulations were built into the materials; we hoped this
would reduce and possibly even eliminate suspiciousness by the participants about the
experiment.
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to return a verdict and to assess the
likelihood that the defendant was guilty of the accused crime. In addition, they were
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asked whether any particular witness’s testimony had been especially influential in their
determination of guilt. We were interested in whether the objection or interruption would
cause participants to say that they had relied more (or less) on the objected-to testimony
and whether their designation of particular testimony as influential was related to their
verdicts.
Method
Participants
A total of 326 undergraduates at the University of Virginia participated for
psychology course credit. Seventeen participants responded that they had previously
seen the episode of Law and Order used in the study, so their data was excluded from
analysis. After this exclusion, there were 120 male and 179 female participants, as well
as 10 people who did not respond to the gender question; participants ranged in age from
17 to 25. Groups of up to12 students participated in the study at one time.
Materials and Procedure
Participants first read and listened to instructions and background information
about a criminal case. Then they watched a one of three versions of videotape depicting
a segment of the criminal trial. The defendant in the trial was accused of having
contributed to his wife’s violent outburst, which ultimately resulted in the death of their
daughter. The critical (incriminating) testimony occurred when the prosecutor asked the
defendant whether he provided his wife with cocaine—a substance known to have
contributed to his wife’s aggression. In the versions that included an objection or
interruption, it occurred immediately following this question. In all instances the
question was admissible, so the defendant provided an answer. The defendant’s answer
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was vague—this was intentional because it was important to create enough ambiguity
that jurors could be swayed by the interruption or objection.
In the No-Objection condition, the question and answer followed without any type
of disruption. The Simple-Interruption condition contained a 10-second pause in the
tape—filled with alternating blank screens and “snow”—between the prosecutor’s
question and the defendant’s answer. The Objection-Admissible condition contained an
objection from the defense attorney immediately following the prosecution’s question.
This objection was overruled and the defendant was instructed by the judge to answer the
question.
Immediately after watching the trial, participants were asked to render a verdict,
rate their confidence in this verdict, and provide an opinion as to how likely it was that
the defendant was guilty (regardless of verdict). They were also asked which witness, or
what testimony (if any) most influenced their decision. Finally, they provided
demographic information.
Results and Discussion
Results were consistent with those from Experiment 1. The proportion of guilty
verdicts in each condition is shown in Figure 4.
Replication of Experiment 1
First, participants in the Simple-Interruption condition returned fewer guilty
verdicts than those participants in the No-Objection condition, although unlike the results
in Experiment 1, the difference was not significant (49% versus 55%, X2 (1, N=200) =
.072). One possible reason for this difference relates to the difference in the duration of
the interruption in Experiments 1 and 2. By modifying the interruption to make it less
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dramatic, it appears that we diminished the distracting nature of the interruption,
lessening its effect on verdicts.
Second, as in Experiment 1, objecting to critical testimony increased guilty
verdicts: the proportion of guilty verdicts in the Objection-Admissible condition (63%)
was greater than that in the No-Objection condition (55%). However, as in both
measures in Experiment 1, that difference was not significant, X2 [1, N = 209] = 1.49, ns.
Third, also as in Experiment 1, an objection led to more guilty verdicts than a
simple interruption: there were significantly more guilty verdicts in the ObjectionAdmissible condition (63%) than in the Simple-Interruption condition (49%), X2 [1, N =
209] = 4.34, p < .05.
These results, along with the results from Experiment 1, are important for
understanding the potential dual effect of an attorney’s objection. As an interruption, an
objection may serves as a distraction, decreasing the impact of the testimony (here the
critical testimony); however, as a signal that the testimony is important, the objection
appears to increase the use of that testimony.
Interruption as Distraction: Most Influential Witness Results
Support for the idea that an interruption creates a distraction comes from the data
in which participants were asked to name which witness (if any) had a particular
influence on their decision about the verdict. Participants in the Simple-Interruption
condition appear to have been more distracted or less attentive during the defendant’s
testimony (when the interruption and critical testimony occurred) as compared to
participants in the other two conditions. Overall, 33% of the participants named the
defendant as the most influential witness, 25% named the defendant’s wife, 20% named
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the patient, 4% named a combination of two witnesses, and 19% reported that no one
witnesses influenced them more than the others. Participants who indicated that the
defendant was the most influential witness were more likely to find him guilty (69%)
than participants who reported another witness as being most influential (50% guilty; X2
[1, N = 309] = 10.8, p = .001). Significantly fewer participants in the Simple-Interruption
condition thought he was the most influential witness (22%) than in either of the other
two conditions (No-Objection = 39%; Objection-Admissible = 37%), X2 (2, N = 309) =
7.8, p = .02.
The finding that participants were less likely to be influenced by the witness who
was testifying at the time of the interruption supports the theory that interruptions serve
as distractions. This result contradicts some other findings that suggest that interruptions
serve to draw attention to information being presented at the point of disruption,
increasing people’s thoughts and later use of such information
General Discussion
The results of these two studies provide a glimpse into the unique nature of the
courtroom objection. An objection conveys information to jurors that causes them to pay
particular attention to the information, and ultimately, to weight it more heavily. By
making explicit a desire to keep jurors from using certain damaging information, the
objecting side may actually be frustrating the very goal it set out to achieve. On the other
hand, a non-objection interruption can distract the listener and lessen the impact of
associated information.
Experiment 1 found some support for the standard failure-to-disregard finding:
participants in the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition who heard the critical
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testimony, the objection, and the instruction to disregard were marginally more likely to
return a guilty verdict than those in the No-Testimony condition who never heard the
testimony at all. By itself, this finding tells us little about the role of the objection (or
precisely what forces are at work) because any effects could be attributed to whether the
jurors heard the incriminating testimony, whether there was an interruption, whether that
interruption was an objection, and whether there was an instruction by the judge.
In order to explore the possibility that the objection-interruption hinders
compliance with judge instructions and to determine what about the objection is
important, we included two interruption conditions Although both contained an
interruption, the Testimony-Objection-Admissible condition and the Testimony-SimpleInterruption condition differed in whether the interruption suggested that one side wanted
to prevent the testimony from being used and whether there was a ruling (in this case that
the testimony was admissible) or whether the interruption contained no meaningful
information whatsoever. By comparing each of these conditions with each other and with
the Testimony-No-Objection condition, we were able to pinpoint the effect of the
objection itself. Relative to the Testimony-No-Objection condition, the introduction of a
simple interruption dramatically decreased use of the testimony and therefore guilty
verdicts. However, relative to the Simple-Interruption condition, the ObjectionAdmissible condition dramatically increased guilty verdicts., What does the ObjectionAdmissible condition add? Whatever it is about the objection that causes an increase in
use of the testimony must be related to its potential for conveying information to jurors.
Specifically, an objection may signal jurors that the testimony has particular importance
because of its potential to harm one side.
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In light of the evidence (pun intended, again) that the objection serves as this type
of signal, it appears that theories of belief perseverance, correction comprehension, story
coherence, hindsight bias, and justice (whichever one subscribes to), cannot be the whole
story. Where there is an objection, there is a cue to jurors that the objecting attorney is
worried about the objected-to testimony. It seems likely that at least part of the reason
why jurors fail or are imperfect at disregarding is that they are deriving meaning from the
objection in this fashion.
An astute reader will have noticed that our design confounded an attorney’s
objection with a judge’s ruling: both conditions containing an objection also included a
ruling. The judge’s instruction is the basis for two theoretical explanations for jurors’
failure to follow instructions to disregard. First, reactance theory posits that jurors resent
the perceived threat to their freedom to use what information they see fit in rendering a
decision. Second, the ironic processes theory states that when individuals are instructed
not to think of something, that thing becomes more, rather than less likely to come to
mind. However, neither explanation holds up well against all of the data. With respect to
reactance theory, when jurors are told not to use the critical testimony they do anyway
(they fail to perfectly follow instructions to disregard). However, when the judge
explicitly instructs them to use the critical testimony, they also do (the TestimonyObjection-Admissible condition yielded a greater number of guilty verdicts than
Testimony-No-Objection and Testimony-Simple-Interruption). Jurors would appear to
be reacting against one instruction but not the other. Because this explanation does not
make sense, it would seem that reactance is not the explanation for juror behavior. Ironic
processes theory also succeeds at explaining the standard effect but has nothing to say
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about the conditions in which the testimony is present and participants are allowed to use
it (i.e., it is not “ironic” to exhibit an increased use of information that one is told to use.)
Therefore, we are left with our preferred explanation of the data: jurors want to use
information that they perceive lawyers deem particularly important or potentially
dangerous, in other words, information that lawyers want kept out of the decision-making
process.
These results, have implications for litigators’ objection strategy. We found that
although jurors are imperfect at following instructions to disregard, exposure to an
admonition can decrease their use of incriminating testimony. This finding suggests that
a well-placed objection can achieve the desired effect – but only when the ruling favors
the objecting party. An objection that is overruled can, far from succeeding in
minimizing the influence of testimony, exacerbate damage caused by harmful
information. An attorney who appears to fear jurors’ use of incriminating evidence
ignites suspicion in jurors. Unlike an objection, a simple interruption (such as a break in
the courtroom action for a recess) appears to distract jurors from testimony that
immediately precedes the interruption. Future research might explore the boundaries of
this effect to determine whether bringing out damaging evidence immediately prior to a
recess diminishes its impact on verdicts.
Finally, although more work must be done, we have gained invaluable insight into
how interruptions, and specifically objection-interruptions can affect verdicts. We do not
claim that a desire to use information that a lawyer wants to omit is the sole explanation
for all of the failure-to-disregard findings. We have, however, added to the theoretical
framework that may explain this troubling phenomenon.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 conditions.
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Figure 2. Percent Guilty Verdict (Dichotomous Measure) in Experiment 1.
Figure 2. Percent guilty verdicts (dichotomous measure) in Experiment 1.
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Note: Lighter bars show conditions in which critical testimony was present and allowed
to be used. Failure to disregard incriminating evidence is demonstrated when participants
in the Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible condition return more guilty verdicts than
participations in the No-Testimony condition. Some ability to disregard incriminating
evidence is demonstrated when Testimony-Objection-Inadmissible is less than
Testimony-Objection-Admissible. We added the Testimony-No-Objection and
Testimony-Simple-Interruption conditions to investigate the role of the objection as an
interruption per se.
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Figure 3. Scaled guilt ratings (0-9) in Experiment 1. (Lighter bars show conditions in
which critical testimony was present and allowed to be used.)
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Figure 4. Percent guilty verdicts in Experiment 2. (Lighter bars show percentages from
Experiment 1.)
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